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THOUGHTS ON THE NORTH DAKOTA 
PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS ACT 
CHANCELLOR WILLIAM B. CHANDLER III* 
 
Given the topic of the day, and never having traveled to North Dakota, 
I thought it appropriate to find out a bit about the similarities and differ-
ences between our two states.  My superficial internet-based inquiry led me 
to a conclusion all of you probably already know: Delaware is older, small-
er, and lower than North Dakota.  Delaware became a state on December 7, 
1787, and is proudly known by Delawareans as “The First State.”  North 
Dakota became a state over 100 years later, on November 2, 1889.  North 
Dakota is over thirty times the size of Delaware in total land area, but 
Delaware’s population density is over thirty times greater than North 
Dakota’s.  The highest point in Delaware, known as the Ebright Azimuth, is 
nearly 300 feet lower than the lowest point in North Dakota, which is along 
the Red River.  As some of you know, the state bird of Delaware, the Blue 
Hen chicken, is an animal close to my heart, and I was interested in the state 
bird of North Dakota, which I learned is the Western Meadowlark.  That 
appears to be a fine animal, but with all due respect, no comparison to the 
mascot of my alma mater, the University of Delaware.  While satisfying my 
curiosity about North Dakota’s state bird, I discovered another similarity 
between our states that some of you may not know.  North Dakota and 
Delaware share the same state beverage: milk. 
More recently it appears that North Dakota and Delaware share an 
interest in corporate law and corporate governance.  I guess it was natural, 
therefore, that my friend and former colleague, Dean Paul LeBel, invited 
me to deliver remarks about the new North Dakota Publicly Traded 
Corporations Act.  I think Dean LeBel was hoping I would contrast it with 
the Delaware General Corporation Law, the corporate law of my 
jurisdiction, and offer criticisms of the NDPTCA.  These remarks, however, 
will be far more modest in scope. 
 
*William B. Chandler III was appointed Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery in 
1997.  Previously, the Chancellor engaged in private practice, served as Legal Counsel to former 
Delaware Governor Pete DuPont, and served as Resident Judge of the Delaware Superior Court.  
The Chancellor holds membership in the American Law Institute, the Delaware Bar Association, 
and the American College of Business Court Judges.  He is a Trustee of the Weinberg Corporate 
Governance Center at the University of Delaware and the Yale Law School Corporate Governance 
Center. 
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A corporation, of course, is nothing more than an artificial structuring 
of the rights and responsibilities of a business’ owners, the shareholders, as 
well as those chosen by the owners to act on their behalf, the directors and 
officers.  To the extent that corporations excel over other business forms in 
the generation of wealth, they have become the dominant type of commer-
cial organization.  Similarly, to the extent that a particular allocation of 
rights and responsibilities within the strictures of the corporate form excels 
in the creation of wealth for its owners, that particular form will, again, 
prevail.  This is the discipline of the market.  I would like to speak to you 
today, then, about markets; how they affect corporate regulation, how they 
determine what forms corporations and corporate law may take, and how 
they determine the attractiveness of possible forums of incorporation. 
To put the case, perhaps, with a crudity that does justice to the law of 
neither North Dakota nor Delaware, the North Dakota approach to issues of 
corporate governance is characterized by a belief that regulation of corpo-
rate rights and responsibilities can best be done by the state legislature, via 
statute, acting to protect the interests of shareholders as the owners of the 
corporation.  The Delaware approach embodies the belief that the owners 
themselves are, through the flow of their capital, the best regulators of 
corporate governance, that the courts must vindicate the choices made by 
these corporate owners within a framework of common law fiduciary rights, 
and that the discipline of the market (that word again!) will ultimately 
provide the optimum level of shareholder rights. 
It will not surprise you that I am a believer in the Delaware approach.  
As I mentioned, I have the feeling that I was invited here to criticize the 
North Dakota Act.  But why would I do that?  Any paltry criticism I or 
others might offer of an individual state’s approach to corporate governance 
will be irrelevant: a flow of capital to or away from a jurisdiction will ratify 
or denigrate any statutory scheme far beyond our poor power to pass 
judgment.  In any event, I am all for competition.  I am all for different 
approaches to corporate governance being put to the test of real world 
conditions—in the “laboratory” of federalism I will discuss in a moment.  I 
applaud the Legislature and the Governor of North Dakota for having the 
courage to put forth a novel approach to corporate law.  I applaud as well 
the vision and entrepreneurial spirit of the “father” of this legislation, 
William Clark, who not only drafted the Act but attempted to see it 
implemented in his home state of Pennsylvania, then Vermont, and finally, 
successfully, here in North Dakota.  Without his intellectual effort, and 
without his extraordinary perseverance, the North Dakota Act would never 
have come to be. 
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I have said I am in favor of different approaches to corporate regulation 
being given a real-world—that is, market-based—trial, and so I am, so long 
as it is at the state level.  One of the destructive side effects of the current 
economic climate is that it has given Congress the impetus to intrude into 
the field of corporate governance, historically an area properly reserved for 
the states and governed by state law.  The problem with regulation at the 
federal level is that it does not encourage various approaches, as represented 
by the statutes of North Dakota and Delaware, that we are discussing today.  
Just the opposite: regulation by Congress or the SEC stifles the kind of 
healthy experimentation that can lead to improvement in the law.  We have 
seen the destructive effects of such “one-size-fits-all” legislative paroxysms 
arising during economic disruptions far less serious then the current one, 
Sarbanes-Oxley being the most obvious example of blunt and over-broad 
legislative populism driven by public anger inflamed by a sensationalizing 
press producing a cure worse than the illness.  I spoke earlier of the flow of 
capital which may ratify either the North Dakota or the Delaware approach; 
overbearing federal regulation results in a similar flow—the market will not 
be denied—but unfortunately, having no domestic outlet due to the 
preemption of the arena by the federal legislation, the flow is from the 
United States, and to London and other foreign financial capitals. 
But enough of federal misadventures.  What of differing state ap-
proaches like the two before us?  North Dakota now allows an incorporating 
entity to accept an entire slate of regulations designed to enhance 
shareholder control of the corporation; Delaware allows the entity to adopt 
such internal constraints in favor of shareholder control up to, but only up 
to, the extent the entity finds it in its interest to do so.  In other words, what 
North Dakota coercively imposes, Delaware permits.  Both our states’ laws 
regulate only firms incorporating in our respective states, so corporations 
are insulated from the problem of having to follow conflicting rules.  
Because our federal system allows both the North Dakota and the Delaware 
approach to exist, the two statutes will be exposed to a marketplace of many 
individual actors, including corporate decision-makers as well as investors 
directing capital flow to these corporations.  The market will eventually 
reveal which approach is a superior wealth-producer for investors. 
This is the beauty of the federal system, what Yale Law School 
Professor Roberta Romano calls the “genius” of federalism.  This facet of 
federalism embodies neatly the kind of self-organizing structures that 
economic philosophers like F. A. Hayek point out far exceed the ability of 
any group of individuals, acting deliberately, to allocate assets for the 
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production of wealth.  In an earlier time of financial crisis, in New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann1, Justice Brandeis (otherwise no particular fan of free 
markets) stated that: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labora-
tory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country.”2  With the enactment of the Publicly Traded Corporations 
Act, in the arena of corporate governance and shareholders’ rights, North 
Dakota has become the embodiment of Justice Brandeis’ “single coura-
geous state,” and I salute you for it! 
How do I think the marketplace will respond to these two models?  
Again, it will not surprise you to learn that I suspect the Delaware approach 
will ultimately prevail.  Why?  As I have already mentioned, where the 
North Dakota law is prescriptive, the Delaware statute is permissive.  The 
many shareholder-friendly provisions of the North Dakota Act are available 
to Delaware corporations as well, should they choose them.  Delaware’s 
approach to the corporate charter and by-laws is contractual in nature; the 
incorporators can choose the basket of shareholder rights that they believe 
will strike the right balance between corporate stability and governability, 
on one hand, and shareholder rights on the other.  How will they know if 
they have it right?  By the same mechanism that will ultimately pass judg-
ment on the different statutory approaches of North Dakota and Delaware: 
by the flow of capital into the corporation. 
For instance, Delaware permits, but does not require, shareholders or 
directors to adopt by-laws that  require that directors be elected by majority, 
rather than plurality, vote, and that such provision may not be repealed by 
the directors.  Although our statute does not coerce, a majority of Fortune 
500 companies incorporated in Delaware have implemented this option.  
Similarly, Delaware law permits, but does not require, corporations to 
provide that the election of the board of directors be unified, rather than 
staggered.  North Dakota imposes this requirement by statute.  Despite 
Delaware’s permissive approach, staggered boards are disappearing in 
Delaware as shareholders demand their elimination.  Because shareholders 
control the flow of capital, the elimination of staggered boards is brought 
about by the private ordering of actors participating in the activities of the 
firm—that is, by market mechanisms—and not by the prescriptive power of 
the legislature.  The same phenomenon is occurring with respect to poison 
pill provisions:  Delaware allows private ordering of the relationship be-
tween managers and stockholders, and as the absence of a poison pill 
 
1. 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
2. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311. 
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becomes important to shareholders, corporate by-laws increasingly elimi-
nate them.  Thus, I see the privately-ordered charters and by-laws of 
Delaware as every bit as “shareholder friendly” as the regime imposed on 
corporations under the North Dakota law.  More so, in fact, to the extent 
that the market insures that eventually the corporation will “get it right,” 
that is, come up with that combination of streamlined governance and 
shareholder rights which best leads to the formation of wealth.  After all, 
there is no “right” of shareholders more valuable than to be among the 
owners of a corporation that generates wealth! 
Under what set of assumptions would North Dakota’s prescriptive ap-
proach be superior to what I see as the wealth-enhancing privately-ordered 
Delaware approach?  If the assumption is that the full panoply of share-
holder rights mandated by North Dakota is superior to any sub-set of those 
rights, a corporation can, and would have an incentive to, simply choose all 
those rights from the Delaware menu.  If the assumption is that shareholders 
are powerless vis-à-vis managers, then the managers will simply choose to 
incorporate in Delaware without the shareholder protections, so as to keep 
the shareholders at heel.  In this “race to the bottom” scenario, Delaware 
would once again come out ahead.  Even if such an overbearing set of 
managers wished to incorporate in North Dakota, they could choose to opt 
out of the new statute entirely. 
The assumption, therefore, must be that shareholders have enough 
power to ensure the selection of a full set of regulations if offered ready-
made, a la North Dakota, but not sufficient power to negotiate a private 
ordering of rights under the Delaware market-based system.  In that case, 
only under the prescriptive system offered by North Dakota will share-
holders be able to impose a regime that will maximize their rights and at the 
same time their wealth.  Of this proposition, I must say, I am skeptical. 
But I am, of course, biased.  Not alone by being a Delawarean, but by 
being a common-law judge, as well.  As a common-law jurist, I tend to 
believe that the organic growth of a body of law is superior to the strictures 
of a Code Napoleon, with its overweening specification, definition, catego-
rization, and prescription of every imaginable act.  To my admittedly-
prejudiced eye, the North Dakota statute has that look:  the look of a field of 
action so thoroughly occupied by legislative fiat that creativity is crowded 
out.  It is the genius—if I may use that phrase again—of the common law 
that legislative pronouncement is replaced by considerations of the duty of 
one actor to the other.  This idea of duty forms the basis of the American 
model of common law: managers owing fiduciary duties of loyalty, good 
faith, candor, and care to their shareholder-principals.  Unlike the positivist 
North Dakota statute—chock-full of mandatory terms specifying how 
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corporations must go about their business—under Delaware’s equitable 
principles corporate decision-makers are free to act as they find best, within 
the strictures of their fiduciary duties.  This maximizes freedom and creativ-
ity while protecting shareholder interest by requiring that that freedom and 
creativity be conducted for the benefit of the shareholders.  That is what I 
refer to as the genius of the common law. 
Such a system, of course, depends heavily on the exercise of independ-
ent judgment by the judiciary.  Where the limitations on management 
actions are defined by a judicial interpretation of fiduciary duty—rather 
than by an exhaustive list of “dos” and “don’ts” prescribed by the Legisla-
ture—the system will operate only as well as the judges are skillful.  
Delaware was fortunate that, when it first enacted its equitably-based 
general corporate law over a century ago, it had in place a specialized 
court—the Court of Chancery—that was something of an anachronism, a 
court specializing in equity law.  The existence of a court of specialists in 
trusts and equitable relations gave Delaware an advantage then and, in all 
modesty, continues to give it an edge in corporate law today.  No matter 
how brilliant its drafters, no matter haw far-sighted its legislators, no code-
based system can offer the flexibility and nuance of a common law court, 
aided by able counsel, reacting to each individual question of corporate 
governance put before it by interested parities with a stake in the outcome.  
Next to this system, legislative action is a blunt tool indeed.  
The beauty of a decisional-law system like that of the Court of 
Chancery is that it allows protection of shareholder rights in a way that 
encourages shareholder confidence, through an incremental legal develop-
ment using specific factual situations, while still encouraging broad action 
and innovation by corporate officers and directors, protected under our law 
by the business judgment rule.  The judge-made law created by the Court of 
Chancery and by the Delaware Supreme Court is a much finer instrument, 
for good or for ill, than bright-line statutory pronouncements—a scalpel as 
opposed to the legislative axe. 
It appears to be among the intentions of the North Dakota law to blunt 
the advantage that Delaware receives, as a locus of incorporation, from its 
well-regarded court system, by enacting a detailed code that makes legisla-
tors, not judges, the prime actors in the system.  Mr. Clark, I believe, has 
made this argument explicitly.  I have two reasons to doubt the success of 
this project.  First, I doubt any regulations can be comprehensive enough 
and tightly-drafted enough to be free of ambiguities that require interpreta-
tion by judges.  Second, assuming that is possible, it would so restrict cor-
porate action that companies operating under those requirements would be 
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at a significant competitive disadvantage.  But if I am wrong, the experi-
ment you have started here will soon demonstrate it! 
Note that the system of corporate governance in a common law system 
as I have described it—where corporate managers are free to act as they see 
fit, bound by the strictures of their fiduciary duties owed to their 
shareholders—is the direct analog of how freedom works in a market 
system.  In this system, participants are free to retain, sell, and use their 
property as they see fit, constrained by certain legal requirements (indivi-
dual ownership of property, the binding nature of contracts, the requirement 
that representations not be fraudulent, etc.).  In fact, the common-law ap-
proach to corporate governance is simply another kind of market, in which 
corporate managers are free to make decisions to use resources, conduct 
business, and, if they can, create wealth, constrained by broad fiduciary 
duties rather than by rigid and narrow prescriptive law.  If they succeed, 
they will attract capital and prosper.  If they fail, capital will flow 
elsewhere.   
Thus we have come full circle.  The federal system is a marketplace of 
ideas expressed through state legislation.  I applaud North Dakota for 
having entered with a novel approach to corporate law, thus expanding the 
range of choices available and improving the market.  That is one market.  
A second market is created by the methodology of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, in which Delaware permits corporations to choose from 
among a wide array of possible combinations of shareholder powers in the 
realm of corporate governance, a marketplace in which those combinations 
perceived best at producing wealth for shareholders prevail over other 
forms.  A third is the marketplace created by the wide sphere within which 
managers may make decisions in a common-law jurisdiction where 
shareholder protections are defined by fiduciary duties, rather than a rigid 
code, and in which firms prosper or fail accordingly. 
As I have made clear, I favor a market approach over the alternative, 
because, after all, we are dealing here with corporations, and if a market 
approach is not optimal, then we have problems more fundamental than 
determining how best to advance shareholder rights!  In any event, the 
differences between our two approaches are material enough that, if I am 
wrong, we will soon know it.  Let the contest begin, let the marketplace of 
federalism do its work, and let the best system prevail!* 
 
 
*I would like to thank Sam Glasscock (who serves with me on the Court of Chancery as the 
Master in Chancery) and James M. Belger (who served as my Law Clerk for the 2008-2009 term) 
for their invaluable suggestions for and assistance with this speech.  All errors are mine, however. 
